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ATTORNEYS' FEES
Attorneys' Fees Are Costly, But Are They a Recoverable
Cost ofEnvironmental Cleanup Under Superfund?
by Robert H. Abrams
Robert Abrams is professor of law at Wayne State University
School ofLaw, 468 West Ferry Mall, Detroit, M148202, (313)
577-3930, and co-author of a leading environmental law
casebook, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY.
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA") for cleaning up the Landfill. The United States
Air Force was one of the parties uncovered by Key Tronic's
efforts. Concurrently, Key Tronic retained legal counsel and a
consultant to work with the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (the "EPA") and Washington state offi-
cials in developing a remedial plan for the Landfill and reduc-
ing it to a consent decree. That decree was entered, setting
forth the agreed-upon remedy and extinguishing Key
Tronic's further liability in exchange for a sizeable payment
of $4.2 million.
With other PRPs identified at the Landfill, the EPA began
negotiations with them regarding settlement of their liability.
The Air Force agreed to pay the EPA
$1.45 million to extinguish its liabil-
ity for implementing the remedy
selected in the consent decree.
Key Tronic, in the meantime,
sought to shift its loss at the Landfill
to the other PRPs, including the Air
Force. In October 1989, Key Tronic
filed suit against the Air Force, seek-
ing awards for two separate items.
First, Key Tronic sued for the $1.2
million it spent before its settlement
with the EPA. This type of action is
usually referred to as "private cost
recovery" and is authorized by
Section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA.
Second, Key Tronic sought to recov-
er some or all of the $4.2 million it
had paid to the EPA. This type of
action is usually referred to as "con-
tribution" and is authorized by
Section 113(f) ofCERCLA. Because
the Air Force had settled separately
with the EPA and obtained "contribution protection" as
authorized by CERCLA, that portion of Key Tronic's suit was
dismissed early on.
Turning to Key Tronic's $1.2 million cost recovery claim,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington ruled that, as a matter of law, Key Tronic was
entitled to recover. The Air Force and Key Tronic then nego-
tiated an agreement quantifying the liability of the Air Force.
This agreement had two components: $185,000 to reimburse
Key Tronic for costs incurred for well contamination studies
and provision of alternate water supplies to affected well
Case at a Glance
T he Federal ComprehensiveEnvironmental Response,Compensation, and Liability
Act, better known as Superfund, encour-
ages private parties to clean up sites of
environmental contamination. Among
the incentives given to those parties is a
right to sue other potentially responsible
parties for cleanup costs, including the
cost of "enforcement activities" associ-
ated with cleanup. At issue in Key
Tronic is whether a party that took
immediate steps to clean up a contami-
nated site can recover attorneys' fees
and investigative costs, as well as its






Argument Date: March 29, 1994
From: The Ninth Circuit
ISSUE
Do Sections 107(a) and 101(25) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
popularly known as Superfund,
authorize a private party who cleans
up environmental contamination to
recover its attorneys' fees as part of
the costs of cleanup?
FACTS
The Colbert Landfill (the
"Landfill"), located in eastern
Washington State, is operated by
Spokane County, Washington.
During the 1970s, Key Tronic
Corporation (Key Tronic) along with
several other entities, including the
United States Air Force, disposed of
liquid chemicals at the Landfill. In
1980, state testing of nearby drinking
water wells found significant conta-
mination that was traced to hazardous
materials leaking from the Landfill.
Together with Spokane County, Key
Tronic retained consultants and
incurred other costs in taking mea-
sures to provide alternate water supplies and begin the process
of site remediation.
Key Tronic also took steps to identify other potentially
responsible parties ("PRPs"); that is, to identify additional
parties who are liable under the Comprehensive
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users, and $155,000 for (1) prelitigation costs and attorneys'
fees incurred identifying additional PRPs, (2) prelitigation
costs and attorneys' fees incurred working on the consent
decree, (3) attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting the cost
recovery action, and (4) prejudgment interest on the expected
claims.
The district court ruled in favor of Key Tronic, holding that
all of the items were recoverable in a CERCLA cost recovery
action. 766 F.Supp 865 (E.D. Wash. 1991). The Air Force
appealed the holding only insofar as it related to prelitigation
costs and attorneys' fees, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed. 984 F.2d 1025 (1993).
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Above all else this is a case of statutory interpretation with
the key question being whether CERCLA Section 107 autho-
rizes an award of attorneys' fees and other litigation-related
expenses as part of recoverable response costs. The long-
established American Rule is that, win or lose, each side bears
its own attorneys' fees. There are exceptions to the rule, some
grounded in equity and others created by statute. Here,
CERCLA is claimed as the source of a statutory exception in
cost recovery actions because Section 101(25) defines recov-
erable response costs to include the costs of "enforcement
activity."
The legal issue is a close one that has divided the federal
circuit courts. In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit ruled
against the recoverability of fees and litigation costs in private
party actions. In Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir.
1993), and General Electric Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation
Systems, Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits took the opposite view. The Tenth Circuit, in
FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 988 F.2d 842 (lOth Cir.
1993), has adopted an intermediate view that would allow
some of the attorneys' fees contested in this case to be recov-
ered. There are also district court decisions on both sides of
the issue. That various courts have differed on the issue is not
surprising as there are well-reasoned legal arguments on both
sides.
Key Tronic stresses CERCLA policy favoring cost spread-
ing among PRPs and the role of private cost recovery actions
in achieving that goal. To encourage private parties to step
forward and help solve the problems at Superfund sites,
Congress established the private cost recovery action so that
the active private parties could recoup a fair portion of their
expenditures from fellow PRPs. Denying recovery would
undermine the incentive established by Congress by making
the transaction costs of cost recovery a deadweight loss for
cooperative parties who acted to start immediate site cleanup.
Key Tronic also makes an argument based on the amended
text of the statute. In particular, the 1986 Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act added language to
CERCLA Section 101(25) that defined "response" (as in the
phrase "response costs") to "include enforcement activities
related thereto." Key Tronic, relying on that added language,
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claims that beyond its original efforts at the Landfill, its
efforts at identifying PRPs, its efforts at working out a reme-
dial design, and the legal and consulting costs associated with
those efforts are all part of its response costs because they are
within the scope of the response itself, or are associated
enforcement activities.
The Air Force seeks to have the Ninth Circuit affirmed by
arguing that cost shifting is a narrow exception to the
American Rule and requires explicit statutory authorization,
not merely convenient policy arguments. Were that not the
case, the exceptions would begin to swallow the rule. In vir-
tually all remedial statutes that grant a right of recovery to an
injured party, a policy argument favoring cost shifting as fur-
thering legislative intent is available. As to the textual argu-
ment made in this case, the Air Force counters that Congress
knows how to draft explicit fee-shifting language and has
done so in several other parts of Superfund but not in this part.
Consistent with its straightforward appearance, this is a
case of modest significance. Even though the dollar amounts
for cost recovery attorneys' fees in any given case can be
large, the role of attorneys' fees in the mix of incentives to
cooperate may not that great. There are other incentives to
cooperate, not the least of which are the ability to influence
the remedy selected and controlling the cost of implementing
the agreed-upon remedy. Moreover, whatever the decision in
the case, it need not do violence to Congress' desires regard-
ing private cost recovery actions. The issue is one of statutory
interpretation. If Congress is displeased with the result
reached by the Supreme Court, Congress can amend the
statute.
ARGUMENTS
For Key Tronic Corporation (Counsel of Record: James R.
Moore; Perkins Coie, 1201 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA 98101-
3099; (206) 583-8888):
1. CERCLA's policy of encouraging private party initiative
warrants the recovery of attorneys' fees and the other costs
of response in Section 107 cost recovery actions.
2. CERCLA Section 101(25), when it defines "response" to
include "enforcement activities related thereto," authorizes
recovery of attorneys' fees in Section 107 cost recovery
actions.
For the United States (Counsel ofRecord: Drew S. Days, lll,
Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530; (202) 514-2217):
I. The well-established American Rule is that parties must
bear their own attorneys' fees and that exceptions to the
rule are rare.
2. Congressional authorization of attorneys' fee shifting,
when it is done, is accomplished through explicit terms
unlike those appearing in CERCLA Section 101(25).
PREVIEW
